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Abstract
We consider the relationship between the location choices of potentially polluting rms and
local income. Unlike previous research in the area of economic justice, we distinguish between
pollution potential and actual releases of toxic substances in the locality. We explore the rela-
tionship between prot maximizing behavior of potentially polluting rms in their choice of both
location and expenditures to inuence the likelihood of toxic releases and their expected nancial
costs. We proxy the expenditures on prudential behavior by observing the co-localization of waste
remediation activities. Evidence supports the conclusion that rms behave rationally in managing
risk of toxic release.
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1 Introduction
Analysis of industrial localization and concentration has been of considerable interest since, at least,
Marshall in 1920 and spawned a broad literature. However, there is a narrower question of whether
the localization and distribution of polluting activities in the production of tradeables is the result of
rmsstrategic decisions based on local demographic characteristics. This more nuanced question falls
within the strand of literature in the realm of environmental justice as well as the broader context of
industrial organization.
From the perspective of environmental justice, the question is, "Are low income areas or areas
with larger fractions of minorities disproportionately a¤ected by potential health risk associated with
exposure to toxic releases (Hamilton, 1995; Levinson,1996; Wolverton, 2009)?" A concomitant question
is then, "Are polluting rms more likely to locate in lower income or higher minority areas?" On the
other hand, there is the alternative question as to whether or not households self-select locally or
regionally by income due, in part, to a correlation between housing prices and local environmental
quality? If so, the correlation is ex post. Or, is there some combination of these circumstances at
work to create the circumstances the literature reports?
This paper primarily analyzes the rst question while showing that this e¤ect is not the result
of changes in demographic characteristics. Much of the literature has focused on actual or observed
localized toxic releases and the demographic characteristics of the surrounding areas. In our view, the
issue has two dimensions. The rst dimension is whether demographic characteristics in particular,
income of the local area inuences potentially polluting rmslocation choices. Then, importantly,
we consider the second dimension as to whether the potentially polluting rmschoices on prudential
expenditures that result in di¤erent likelihoods of toxic release are inuenced by local demographic
characteristics. That is, even though the previous literature has found correlation between toxic
releases and lower income levels in the surrounding areas, it does not necessarily mean that potentially
polluting rms are more likely to locate in lower income areas, but rather that potentially rms in
those lower income areas are more likely to realize that pollution potential because they take fewer
costly precautions.
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Therefore, in this paper, we take a di¤erent approach, one that has the potential to add a critical
understanding of location decisions of potentially polluting rms and their decisions that inuence the
likelihood of toxic releases. That is, we dont restrict the analysis to reported toxic releases, but we
consider the universe of rms in industries that are represented in the Toxic Release Inventory, the
potentially polluting rms,1 and analyze the demographic characteristics of the local area in the areas
where these rms are located or locate.
To clarify the relationship between the location and toxic waste management choices of potentially
polluting rms and local income levels, we rst provide a theoretical framework. A potentially polluting
rm seeking to maximize prots will be concerned about the liability of toxic releases and the threat
such releases pose to its nancial results. It will therefore take the residential characteristics of a
location into account when valuing the legal costs and compensation it will have to pay in the event
of a toxic release (Coase, 1960) and balance these costs with the costs of inuencing the likelihood of
toxic release through waste management services. Compensation for damages will of course increase as
local property values and incomes are higher. Moreover, in the event of a toxic release, the probability
of collective action by residents and other businesses may be higher. As proposed by Olson (1965),
the expected benets/awards of such actions are directly related to local income levels.
The combination of these two factors leads to a negative relationship between rm-level pollution
and local income, consistent with the environmental justice literature. As the rms exposure to
pollution-related nancial risk increases, a prudential response is to manage that risk by employing
more waste management and remediation services. Two otherwise identical rms, one in a high income
neighborhood and the other in a low income neighborhood, would be expected to demand di¤erent
levels of waste management and remediation services, positively correlated to the surrounding incomes.
Like any rm choosing a location, a rm engaged in a potentially polluting activity needs to
1A potentially polluting rm is dened as any rm, regardless of size or reporting requirements, in a NAICS code
identied by the Environmental Protection Agencys Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), excluding NAICS 562 Hazardous
Waste. However, only rms in these NAICS codes that employ at least 10 FTEs and exceed EPA threshold limits in
terms of their processing or usage of designated hazardous or toxic chemicals are subject to mandatory reporting within
the TRI (https://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program). The rms subject to mandatory reporting are
denoted in this paper as TRI-reporting rms. TRI-reporting rms responsible for toxic releases that exceed TRI limits
are identied and treated in this paper as TRI-polluters. So, TRI-polluters are a subset of TRI-reporting rms, and
TRI-reporting rms are a subset of TRI-type (potentially polluting) rms.
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consider the array of attributes of any particular location in terms of their importance in protability.2
A potentially polluting rm, however, must also consider the nancial risk of release and the necessary
costs of managing the likelihood of toxic release. Clearly, as suggested above, a toxic release in a location
in an isolated or low-income area will pose less nancial loss than would be the case for a rm located
in a densely populated or high-income area. And, at the same time, labor costs and rents will be lower
in lower-income areas. On the other hand, workforce availability, economic and social infrastructure
are generally more attractive in densely populated areas. Firms seeking a high quality workforce
or needing well-developed social and economic infrastructure will prefer higher income locations. So,
there are, as always, trade-o¤s and the relationship between local income and the number of rms in
a local area might be non-monotonic.
It seems reasonable to assume that the greater the number of potentially polluting rms, ceteris
paribus, the greater the risk of pollution release. Recognizing that the incentives faced by a rep-
resentative rm result in the realization of a localized aggregation of similar (potentially polluting)
rms, we derive some conditions that can lead to either a positive or negative (or both) relationship
between local income and the total level of potentially polluting activities in a neighborhood. We
then investigate empirically the existence of these predictions of our theoretical framework by looking
at the relationship between the location choices of potentially polluting rms, pollution hazards and
local income levels. In this analysis, we consider the demand for remediation or waste management
services as a demand that arises from rms concerned about the liability of toxic release in terms of
their expected prots. Although not perfectly correlated with localized rmsdemand for environmen-
tal quality, waste management/remediation is the only clearly identied industry involved in pollution
mitigation in the regional non-tradeables sector for which entry and employment data are available.
By and large, the potentially polluting activities considered here result from industrial activity
whose output is not dependent on the local market, i.e., production of tradeables. Firms in these
activities are free to choose any location, subject to zoning restrictions. One might naturally think of
household demand for localized environmental quality to be expressed collectively through the political
2Economists have long been interested in explaining what factors motivate prot-maximizing rms when the choose
to open a new plant or expand an existing facility. There have been studies on the theory of plant location, including
the role of taxes and agglomeration economies. Shadbegian and Wolverton (2012) review the theory, evidence, and
implications of the role of environmental regulations in plant location decisions.
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process and reected in a regulatory or statutory framework that restricts the nature, location and
technologies of productive activities. By restricting our analysis to a single state, Texas, we control
for an otherwise heterogenous regulatory framework.3 There are few local environmental restrictions
imposed in the State of Texas, beyond local zoning laws, and the state itself takes a relatively light
hand to regulation. Thus, jurisdictions in the state are largely subject to a practically identical
regulatory environment.4 Di¤erences in local demand for waste management services must arise from
the consumers of those environmental services, i.e., local rms responding to localized conditions,
and we largely eliminate any localized version of the pollution haven hypothesis due to regulatory
heterogeneity.
One additional point needs to be made. Although residents might broadly express their preferences
for environmental attributes through the political process, they can also express individual preferences
for environmental attributes by moving across jurisdictions (in a Tiebout sense). Thus, a household
that has a strong preference for low risk of toxic exposure would choose a locality in which there is little
or no presence of potentially polluting activities. This would tend to put upward pressure on property
values in the lower risk jurisdictions and to depress property values in the higher risk jurisdictions,
assuming that few, if any, households would prefer a more exposed jurisdiction. This leads to reverse
causality issues and this type of sorting would produce, through time, a negative simple correlation
between the presence of polluting rms and median or average household income.
For this reason, in addition to the analysis of potentially polluting industry localization and house-
hold income, we consider the probability of entry of a potential polluter in and across the given
geographies. By also focusing on entry, we avoid the question of inter-jurisdictional population sort-
ing that might occur in the years following a potentially polluting rms entry. Regional sorting by
income due to the presence or absence of an environmental hazard, if it occurs, would already be
3Texas is an attractive setting to consider given its size. It is the second-largest state in the U.S. both geographically
and economically (with a gross state product of $1.6 trillion dollars in 2016). Its economy would rank 14th in the
world when its gross state product is considered relative to national gross domestic products. It contains signicant
geo-physical diversity and is home to 25 separate MSAs.
4One example of the States interference in local regulatory e¤orts was the widely reported lawsuit brought by the
State against the City of Denton that banned hydraulic fracturing by referendum with 59% of the vote. The State sought
to limit the municipalitys ability to regulate oil and gas activities, to allow the State to pre-empt local regulations, and
to ensure that all local e¤orts to impose regulations be "commercially reasonable." See the Texas Tribune, September
18, 2015 for reporting of the citys failure to block oil and gas activities.
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reected in observed household incomes in the areas proximate or distant to the pre-existing industrial
concentrations (demographic characteristics are given at the time of entry). Given the importance of
waste management activities to generate a local Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) relationship, we
conduct a separate but similar analysis of both localization and likelihood of entry of waste manage-
ment/remediation rms into those geographies while controlling for the presence of TRI-type rms.
In both cases, we control for agglomeration economies that might serve to attract rms into existing
industrial concentrations (Glaeser et al., 1992; Henderson et al. 1995; Combes, 2000; Rosenthal and
Stange, 2003).
Working at the census tract-level, we estimate the relationship between localization of potentially
polluting rms (TRI-type rms) and a set of co-variates including local household income. We nd
that locations and entry probabilities of potentially polluting rms are positively correlated with local
income over only the lower range of income and that these rmsdemands for measures to reduce the
likelihood of toxic release, as proxied by the presence and entry of waste management/remediation
rms, show a similar, but amplied, pattern and are positively correlated with the presence of poten-
tially polluting rms. We also nd very persuasive evidence that the relative frequency of toxic release,
i.e., the ratio of toxic releases to the number of potentially polluting rms, is negatively correlated with
proximate household income.
The rm-level prot-maximization approach used in this paper has been common to economists
investigating rm siting choices in relation to environmental issues. For example, List and Co (2000)
used a conditional logit model to investigate in which states multinational rms make investments,
leveraging variation in state environmental policies to consider whether foreign direct investment is,
in part, driven by environmental standards. Likewise, List, McHone, and Millimet (2003) considered
plant relocation choices made by rms, again nding di¤erences in environmental factors (in this
case, air quality regulations) signicantly alter location choices. Turning to entry models, Keller and
Levinson (2002) investigates the number of new foreign-owned plants as a function of abatement costs
to determine the e¤ect of environmental-related compliance costs on the location of foreign direct
investments. In our paper, by restricting the analysis to a single state, Texas, we control for an
otherwise heterogenous regulatory framework and focus on non-regulatory environmental factors and
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how these factors a¤ect rmssiting and location choices.
Both our models stylized facts and empirical estimation are consistent with a relationship similar
to that expressed by the EKC. Our results lead us to conclude that the inverse U-shaped relationship
between income and toxic release is, at least partially, the product of potentially polluting rms seeking
to maximize expected prots in recognition of the nancial risk associated with a toxic release. This
empirical nding at small geographical scale is novel in the eld of environmental economics and has
clear application to both the literature on environmental justice and macro-scale economic analyses of
the EKC.
We say this because the environmental justice literature has primarily focused on the relationship
between local income and pollution exposure (Arora and Cason, 1999 and, Brooks and Sethi, 1997).
While these papers nd some empirical evidence of an EKC-type curve, the theoretical relationship
between levels of undesirable localized emissions and regional or local income that would generate an
inverted U-shaped curve or the role of the remediation industry have not been investigated. Hamilton
(1995) and Wolverton (2009) nd evidence that polluting rms choose to locate disproportionately
in poor areas. However, in their analysis, they consider only rms in the Environmental Protection
Agencys Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) which have actually reported a toxic release. While these
results might well portray an e¤ective reality, we nd that limiting the analysis to TRI rms that have
a release on record is overly narrow and may miss a useful, broader picture.
Polluting rms in the TRI are clearly only a subset of the larger universe of rms that can potentially
have a toxic release. The question should not revolve around previous releases, assuming post-release
remediation measures have been successful, but rather potential releases. Since similar rms in di¤erent
household income localities may choose di¤erent levels of e¤ort to limit releases, rms in lower income
or less developed areas may simply be more likely to experience a release because the lower nancial
consequences of a release do not justify the cost of additional precautionary measures.
Second, with the seminal papers by Grossman and Krueger (1993, 1995) that introduced the con-
struction of the EKC, there was considerable interest in examining the empirical relationship between
environmental quality and income (Harbaugh et al., 2002; Stern, 2004). Many theoretical models
have tried to o¤er consistent explanations of the EKC (de Bruyn and Heintz, 1999). However, these
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models typically use the representative agent or social welfare framework. They are, thus, focused on
the demand side of the equation and not suitable for considering how rms approach production and
pollution decisions.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in section 2, we present our theoretical framework and in
section 3 we develop our empirical approach to study the existence of a local EKC-type relationship.
In section 4, we explain the patterns of entry and exit in the remediation industry. Section 5 lays out
the conclusions.
2 Theoretical analysis
The question of residentsexposure to local pollution has two dimensions: (1) polluting rms location
choices, and (2) their pollution level decisions. Local characteristics, including local income are likely
to a¤ect both the number of potentially-polluting rms in a locality and their e¤orts to avoid releases
of hazardous waste in the environment. We develop a simple theoretical framework to illustrate under
which conditions the combination of these two elements can lead to a negative or positive relationship
between local pollution and income. We then use our theoretical structure to motivate our empirical
analysis.
2.1 Firm-level toxic releases
From an individual polluters perspective, releasing toxic chemicals in the environment is costly because
the rm will have to implement a clean-up program, pay penalties and compensate the local residents
for damages.5 Higher incomes (and associated higher property values) are expected to increase the
costs of release in a local area (Hamilton, 1995) since, in litigation, injured parties recover damages
based on reduced property values or, in the case of impacts that limit work or productive ability, lost
income. Also, a higher-income area might be associated with a higher probability of collective actions
by local residents to force the rm to implement a more thorough clean-up program in case of release.
To avoid legal and/or clean up costs associated with toxic releases, rms handling hazardous sub-
stances can undertake e¤orts to prevent these releases through costly waste management practices
5 Indeed, most disposal or other release practices are subject to a variety of regulatory requirements designed to
minimize potential harm to human health and the environment.
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such as treatment and recycling.6 Below we outline a simple framework to illustrate how rms balance
these two types of costs.
A representative potentially polluting rm is located in area l, characterized by a median income
ml and some other local characteristics Zl. The production process generates or uses some hazardous
substance x. Let el be the amount of the hazardous substance that is released in the local area (posing
a threat to the environment and human health) and al = x   el be the amount that is treated or
recycled. The cost of release is elh(ml), where h(ml) is the rm unit cost of release (e.g. cost of ex post
remediation per unit of pollutant and/or compensation paid to local residents per unit of pollutant).
As suggested above, h0(ml) > 0.7 Avoidance activities dont cause any damage but have an increasing
and convex cost p(al) (with p(0) = 0, p0(al) > 0 and p00(al) > 0 for all 0  al  x). The total pollution
cost can then be written as:
cl(el;ml) = elh(ml) + p(x  el)
Conditional on the decision to locate a new plant in area l, a rm will choose a level of releases,
el = arg min
el
cl(el;ml).8 An interior solution el > 0 will be given by:
h(ml) = p
0(x  el )
The optimal pollution cost cl(el ;ml) = c

l is increasing in income, such that higher income areas
imply higher costs of pollution. We can also show that rms tend to reduce their releases (and so







6Avoiding toxic releases can be done either ex ante (through pollution prevention activities, referred as P2 activities)
or ex post (through waste management practices that prevent releases once hazardous wastes have been generated during
the production process). However, previous studies (Harrington, 2012, 2013; Khanna et al 2009; Florida and Davison,
2001) show that local community characteristics, such as local income, have limited impact on P2 activities. Moreover,
the e¤ectiveness of P2 activities in achieving environmental targets or reducing pollution has shown to be limited only
to some toxic chemicals and some industries (Sam, 2010; Gamper-Rabindran, 2006). This is why we focus on waste
management practices and we implicitly assume that the total amount of waste generated by the production process
does not depend on local income.
7We also assume that h(0) = h, where h is a basic, obligatory clean-up program that must be undertaken by rms,
in case of toxic release, regardless of citizens demand for or willingness to pay for a better environment.
8As p00(al) > 0, the rst-order condition is su¢ cient for a minimum. Moreover, there will be an interior solution to
this problem if p0(0) < h(ml) < p0(x).
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Consistent with the environmental justice literature, lower income areas will be disproportionately
subject to localized releases, although not necessarily more densely populated by TRI-type rms.
Note that the rate at which rms releases decrease with income will depend on the unit cost h(ml).
In particular, if the unit cost of release is convex in income, the optimal amount of releases at the
rm-level, el will be decreasing and concave in income.
9
2.2 Number of rms
In a prot-maximization framework (Levinson, 1996; Wolverton, 2009), a potentially-polluting rm
considering the location of a new plant will choose the neighborhood with the attributes (ml; Zl) that
lead to the highest expected prot. A rms expected prot in a local area l is given by:
bl = F (wl; yl; cl ; vl)
where wl is a vector of local input prices, yl is a vector of local xed factors (e.g. land, labor), cl
is the optimal pollution cost derived in the previous section, and vl is a vector of other local factors
that might a¤ect the expected prots (e.g. minority ratio, residentspropensity to engage in collective
actions...).
Intuitively, the higher the expected prot in a local area, the larger the number of rms located
in this area. As local attributes (ml; Zl) (including existing agglomeration economies) a¤ect the argu-
ments of bl, the geographic distribution of rms/industries will depend on these local characteristics
that drove their initial location decisions. Thus, we can write the equilibrium number of potentially-
polluting rms in local area l as (ignoring the integer constraint on the number of rms for expositional
purposes):
Nl = N(ml; Zl) (2)
One reason why expected prot, and so the number of rms, might be negatively a¤ected by local
income is as argued above. That is, a rms pollution cost cl is increasing, ceteris paribus, in local









< 0 (if p(al) is a quadratic function).
9
prots. For example, more cohesive and e¤ective collective action in wealthier areas (Olson, 1965) may
act as a deterrent to certain rms considering a given location. Some neighborhoods/communities may
lobby the local government to adopt stricter environmental standards above any broader regulatory
requirements (see Fishel, 2005). Their ability to do so (included in the vector vl) will depend on their
income and willingness to bear the costs of the e¤ort to achieve a cleaner environment. Moreover,
higher income areas will be characterized by higher rental costs (wl), which may reduce the potential
prot and the attractiveness of the locality.
Nevertheless, there are, as noted above, some o¤setting benets available in higher income areas
that might attract and retain rms. Although wage rates may be higher, higher wage rates reect
higher marginal products of labor (quality of workforce) and, in the case of rms that require high skill
labor inputs, reect the availability of a workforce that matches their hiring needs (yl). Moreover, even
if rms employ workers from other areas, higher income neighborhoods tend to have better physical
and social infrastructure. This may contribute to lower logistical costs and help to retain workers or to
attract workers from these other areas. Taken together, the elements outlined above suggest that the
relationship between the number of rms and local income is di¢ cult to predict on a purely theoretical
level. That is, this relationship may be complex and non-monotonic.
2.3 Local pollution and income
We now investigate the relationship between total pollution in area l, Nl e

l , and local income ml. It
will depend on how the functions Nl and e

l vary with income (i.e. expressions (1) and (2).
First, note that, if the number of rms in a given location is decreasing in local income (i.e. rms
always prefer to locate in low-income areas), total pollution will be decreasing, ceteris paribus, for all
levels of local income, as predicted by the environmental justice literature.
However, it is very likely that for relatively low levels of income, the benets of locating in an
area with better quality workforce and physical infrastructure can outweigh the higher costs of land
or pollution such that the equilibrium number rms in a local area is increasing with the local income.
If that is the case and if for some income levels, the increase in the number of rms more than o¤sets












be the elasticities of Nl and e

l with respect to local income. An
increase in the number of rms will more than o¤set the reduction in individual releases if "N;m > j"e;mj.
We summarize these results in the following proposition:






> 0 for all ml 2 [m; m], and
2. "N;mj"e;mj > 1 for all ml 2 [m; m]
Otherwise, total pollution in area l is decreasing in local income.
3 Empirical analysis
We now turn to the empirical analysis of the relationship between local income, industrial localization
and local environmental quality. For our purposes, a local area is the census tract. Census tracts in
populous areas are relatively small. Thus, it represents the locality closely adjacent to any potentially
polluting rm located in the tract. It also closely represents the population that bears the immediate
environmental impact in case of toxic release. As previously noted, the analysis is limited to the
State of Texas. Aside from the benet of a homogeneous regulatory environment, we also are able
to take advantage of access to detailed establishment-level data from the Texas Quarterly Census of
Employment and Wages, as described below. Recognizing that the data are at the establishment level,
we use the more usual terminology of the rm to indicate a specic productive facility.
3.1 TRI data
The Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) is a mandatory reporting program managed by the U.S. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency for a set of industries that use or produce certain toxic or dangerous
chemicals. The EPCRA (Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act) Section 313 re-
quires TRI reports to be led by owners and operators of facilities that meet all of the following
criteria:
 The facility has 10 or more full-time employee equivalents (FTE);
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 The facility is included in a given subset of the North American Industry Classication System
(NAICS); and
 The facility manufactures (dened to include importing), processes, or otherwise uses any EPCRA
Section 313 chemical in quantities greater than the established threshold in the course of a cal-
endar year.10
As pointed out in Footnote 1, we dene three sets of TRI-related rms. We refer to all rms
located in a NAICS subject to TRI reporting, regardless of whether reporting is mandatory for the
rm, as a TRI-type rm or potentially polluting rm but exclude rms in the NAICS 562 Waste
Management and Remediation Services (this sub-sector group includes establishments engaged in the
collection, treatment, and disposal of hazardous waste materials, see details below). There are 100,180
unique UI account numbers corresponding to this category of rms. Within the category of TRI-type
rms are the rms for whom reporting is mandatory. Firms for whom reporting is mandatory are
called TRI-reporting rms, a subset of TRI-type rms. TRI-reporting rms are not necessarily rms
that experienced a toxic release. We cannot identify these rms directly from TRI data, but we can
identify rms in the dataset that are located in NAICS codes for which reporting is mandatory and
which have 10 or more FTEs. There are 32,441 rms thus identied as TRI-reporting rms. Firms
that actually report toxic chemical releases are treated as a TRI-polluters for the year in which the
release is reported. As such, a rm can be a polluter in year t, but not a polluter in year t+ i. There
are 795 unique rms that report a release over the period of this analysis. All other industries are
treated as either non-TRI-type industries (i.e. they dont handle any toxic substance listed in the TRI
Program) or remediation industries (NAICS 562). Lastly, there are 509,785 unique non-TRI-type, on
remediation rms in the dataset.
The EPA also provides toxicity weights for each toxic chemical listed in the TRI Program which
allows us to compute a tract-level toxicity index by aggregating all TRI-pollutersreleases, measured
in pounds of toxicity, within a tract. In our analysis, we only study the current-years level of toxic
releases because most TRI chemicals dont accumulate in the environment. Even though this index
10See https://www.epa.gov/toxics-release-inventory-tri-program for details on on NAICS codes, listed chemicals, and
chemical thresholds required for reporting.
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only takes into account toxic releases from TRI polluters, we believe it constitutes a good proxy for
the level of pollution in a local area. A rm may not report to the TRI Program for several reasons:
it may not have had 10 or more full-time employees, its releases may have fallen below the reporting
threshold or it may have failed to report. Therefore, total toxicity may exceed the reported number.
While some papers (de Marchi and Hamilton (2006), and Koehler and Spengler (2007)) point to some
underreporting, overall compliance was nevertheless high. Moreover, we believe it likely that releases
by small rms probably represent a relatively small portion of total toxicity. This seems to indicate that
the reason why TRI-type rms do not report is that their releases fall below the reporting threshold,
so at levels the are not too damaging for the environment.
If rms dont report toxic releases, it might be because they successfully manage their hazardous
wastes in di¤erent ways, e.g. treatment, recycling or disposal. This type of activity (even if the
waste is treated on-site) is not carried out by the polluting rms because it requires an extensive and
potentially costly government permitting process. Thus, they are usually carried out by specialized
rms belonging to the remediation industry. The services supplied by these companies are local and
often very specialized (depending on the type of polluting industry, pollutants, etc.) and typically
require highly skilled/trained workers. Moreover, hazardous waste generated at a particular site often
requires transport to an approved treatment, storage or disposal facility.
We restrict the waste management/remediation sector to four industry sub-sectors in NAICS 562
Waste Management and Remediation Services. Specically, we consider establishments in NAICS
562112 Hazardous Waste Collection, 562211 Hazardous Waste Treatment and Disposal, 562910 Reme-
diation Services, and 562920 Materials Recovery Facilities (recycling). We shall refer to these four
NAICS codes collectively as either waste management or remediation industries (for our purposes,
these two terms refer to the same set of industries).
3.2 Firm-level data
All rm and industry-level data are derived from the Texas Quarterly Census of Employment and
Wages (QCEW) for the years 20002006 as provided by the Texas Workforce Commission.11 The
11The main data used in this study were collected and provided by the Texas Workforce Commission. These data are
fully-disclosed (tax ID, locations, wages, and employment) and are not available to the general public. We were able
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QCEW reports data at the establishment level, including exact address, geographical coordinates, age,
parent company, monthly employment, and quarterly payroll for all establishments in Texas subject
to reporting under the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program. Di¤erent establishments within the
same rm are identied by unique identication numbers and reported separately.
3.3 Census-tract data
Median income and population statistics at the census tract level are taken from the U.S. Census
Bureau. For Census-based data, we linearly interpolate co-variates from Census 2000 and Census
2010 to generate yearly observations at the tract level. The realizations of the variables we use
from Census 2000 and Census 2010 are of course highly correlated with each other. For example, the
correlation between median income in 2000 and 2010 is 0.95. A few Census 2000 tracts are divided in
Census 2010. We aggregate variables (or construct population-weighted averages, where appropriate)
to obtain corresponding Census 2000 tract information. We also consider some measures of local
infrastructure (and, by that proxy, transportation costs) using the number of roads, number of rail
roads, road construction expenditures.
Summary statistics are reported in Table 1.12 We observe that there are only 0.084 incumbent
waste remediation rms per tract. For a representative tract, there are 4.018 TRI-type rms. Average
median household income for the tracts is about $43,930 and the average wage paid by establishments
in each tract is about $38,250 in the sample period.13 For a given tract, the average population is
about 5,088 and the average unemployment rate is about 4.468 percent. The average house value is
about $126,000.
to acquire them under the terms of non-disclosure agreement. We can only provide the data under the terms of this
agreement either in terms of establishment-level aggregation at the NAICS-6 or some industry aggregation of NAICS-6
establishment-level data at the county level. We can report total county-level data at NAICS-6 if there are at least four
establishments in the county with no establishment representing more than 60% of the the total county employment in
the given NAICS-6 industry. Interested researchers can contact the Texas Workforce Commission for data requests.
12A description of these variables is provided in Table A. 1.
13The median income refers to the residents of a particular tract, while wage refers to the wage paid by establishments
located in this tract to their workers, who are not necessarily living in the same tract.
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3.4 Testing for a relationship between localized pollution releases and area
income
We start our empirical analysis by investigating the relationship between local pollution and median
income. Our measure of local pollution is the EPA toxicity index (in pounds) within a tract. As it
will be shown in the next section, our data exhibit an EKC-type relationship between our measure
of local pollution and median income. Using Proposition 1, we can derive some su¢ cient conditions
for a local EKC. We will test empirically these conditions to investigate whether rmslocation and
pollution decisions are consistent with the observed pattern of local income and toxic releases:
1. Nl is concave in income, with limml!0N

l = 0, and reaches a maximum at some income level
ml = bm > 0 ;
2. h(ml) is convex in income, which implies that individual releases el are decreasing and concave
in income.
Condition 1 suggests that some areas are too undeveloped to attract industrial economic activity.
Therefore, for relatively low levels of income, the benets of locating in an area with better quality
workforce and physical infrastructure can outweigh the higher costs of land or pollution such that the
equilibrium number rms in a local area is increasing with the local income. Then, as local incomes
increase and pollution, land and labor costs increase pari passu, the relationship between the number
of industrial rms and income is likely to atten out or even turn down as the costs tend to increase
relative to the benets.
Under condition 2, an increase in income will have a larger e¤ect on the unit cost of releases,
resulting in larger releases reduction for higher values of median income. Combining conditions 1 and
2, we obtain that for relatively low income levels (where Nl is very small), the increase in the number
of rms in a location more than o¤sets the reduction in individual rm-level releases. Then, as income
increases, Nl attens out while the e¤ect of income on optimal releases increases. As a result, after
some income level m < bm such that "N;m = j"e;mj, the increase in the number of rms will be o¤set
by the reduction in individual rm-level releases.
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We will check the validity of the rst condition in the empirical analysis by looking at the rela-
tionship between the total number of potentially polluting rms (TRI-type rms) and median income,
controlling for the relevant additional factors.
Testable hypothesis 1 : The number of TRI-type rms is increasing and concave in the tract median
income up to some income level.
We check for the second condition in two di¤erent ways. First, we look at the relationship between
income and property values (used as a proxy for unit cost of releases) in a given geography and our
data show that the relationship is indeed convex (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). Second, we verify
that individual releases are decreasing and concave in income by using the proportion of TRI-reporting
rms that report a release in any given year relative to the set of potentially polluting rms, i.e., TRI-
type rms, and estimate how local characteristics, including local income, a¤ect the relative frequency
of TRI-polluters.14
Testable hypothesis 2 : The relative frequency of TRI-polluters is decreasing and concave in the tract
median income.
One of the basic premises of our theoretical framework is that in order to reduce their toxic releases
rms spend more on waste management practices. As a proxy for waste management expenditures,
we use the number of remediation rms per tract. Indeed, revenues of the remediation industry are
for the most part reected in costs of the local potentially polluting rms. This leads to our third
hypothesis:
Testable hypothesis 3 : Remediation rms will be more likely to locate in areas with larger numbers of
TRI-type rms and in areas characterized by a higher median income.
14Note that in our data, we only observe toxic releases by rms reporting to the TRI Program and not for all the
potential polluters. We use the number of TRI-polluters, not the number of toxic releases. A TRI-polluter could have
more than one release per calendar year.
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3.5 Results
To test the predictions of the theoretical analysis, we estimate an empirical model that takes the
following form:
ylt = Xlt+  t + lt (3)
where y, depending on the specication, is total toxicity in pounds in each tract or the total number of
rms in the TRI-type sector and in the remediation industry per tract at a given time. Xl = (m;Z)0l
is the tract-l specic characteristics treated as median income m, average wage, college ratio, number
of amenity-type establishments, infrastructure, population density, unemployment rate, land area,
housing rental ratio, and housing prices in the year, t. Of these variables, median income is of particular
interest in this analysis and we employ a cubic specication for income. Estimation results are reported
in Table 2. 15 The results for income are then graphed, ceteris paribus, in Figure 2. The familiar
inverted U-shaped curve is present for the relationship between total toxicity and median income,
peaking at median income of approximately $65,000, as in De Silva, et al (2016). These results
conrm the presence of an EKC-type relationship between local income and local pollution.
Of interest, the total numbers of rms in the TRI-type sectors in a tract increase and then level
o¤ at higher income levels, supporting our rst testable hypothesis that the EKC is consistent with an
increasing and concave number of rms.16 The number of rms in the waste remediation industry rise
proportionately (slightly) slower than does the TRI-type sector over higher income levels, although
they track closely for the most part, indicating that potentially-polluting rms in higher income tracts
tend to utilize more remediation services. As one would expect from our third testable hypothesis,
there is substantial correlation in Column 4 between the number of remediation rms and the number
of TRI-type rms in each tract. These results indicate that, not surprisingly, remediation rms are
more likely to locate in areas where a high number of potentially-polluting rms are present. In the
next section, we investigate this result for remediation rms in more detail.
In Table 3, using the observed turning points in Figure 2, we re-estimate these relationships for
15De Silva et al. (2016) show that high polluting rms locate in high minority areas. As rent and income are correlated
with race, we also estimate our models including the minority ratios. Our main ndings remain consistent and these
results are reported in Tables A2-A3 in Appendix.
16We also estimate the e¤ect of local income on the total number of employees in a tract and the results are qualitatively
the same as with the number of rms. These results are available upon request.
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the same set of correlates and the same three independent variables. However, in these estimations,
we identify three intervals for median income in order to estimate linear splines, or piecewise linear
relationships between the independent variables and median income. We nd a positive relationship
over the median income range $0-66,700 for all three specications, and a weakly signicant negative
relationship only for the highest range of median income with respect to toxicity. This reinforces the
key observation in Figure 2 that a local EKC is consistent with a number of rms in waste remediation
and TRI-type sectors that rst increase with median income and then level o¤ as median income levels
increase beyond the threshold value.
Finally, we estimate the relative frequency of toxic releases (above the EPA threshold) reported to
the TRI Program as a function of local income (testable hypothesis 2). Given the nature of our depen-
dent variable, we estimate this fractional model using the method proposed by Papke and Wooldridge
(1996). This is intended to capture the behavioral outcomes of TRI-type rms as a function of income.
Results in Table 4 conrm that local income has a stronger impact on the relative frequency of toxic
releases in higher-income tracts, indicating that the relative frequency of rm-level releases decreases at
a lower rate for relatively low income levels than for higher income levels. This last result is consistent
with the environmental justice literature; that is, rmsbehavior toward the pollution risk, as well as
localization, depends on local income.
3.6 Robustness Checks
3.6.1 Self-sorting by TRI-type rms
One concern might be that the result of a decreasing frequency of TRI polluters arises because of self-
sorting by TRI-type rms. If those industries that have a higher likelihood of release tend to cluster
in lower income areas, and those industries that have a lower likelihood of release are more likely to
be found in higher income neighborhoods, then this result will emerge. To this point, we might note
that this is not inconsistent with our hypotheses and results so far. Rather it would tend to reinforce
the environmental justice argument. Nevertheless, we separated three industries at NAICS-3 for
individual analysis. Our selection was based on the specic industries shares of all establishments in
the TRI-type industries. We chose industries with a high, medium and low proportion of the complete
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set of TRI-type rms. Specically, we chose chemicals, fabricated metal, and miscellaneous n.o.s. As
reported in Table 5, the relative frequency of rms reporting toxic releases in both the chemicals and
fabricated metal sectors retain a similar appearance to the relative frequency that appears for the
TRI-type industries. The relative frequency of miscellaneous is not signicantly related to income,
perhaps because this industry is too sparsely present in the data
One other sorting issue may be that rms change locale to leave demographic conditions for a more
suitable neighborhood in terms of nancial risk associated with a release. During the course of the
data, fewer than one-tenth of one percent of rms (90 TRI-type rms, of which 17 were TRI-reporting
rms, out of a total of 100,180 TRI-type establishments) changed census tract. We do not nd this
issue to be important in this case.
3.6.2 Causality
A potential issue may be that our demographic variables are contemporaneous. Therefore, we re-
estimate these localization regressions with demographic characteristics lagged by a period. Our re-
sults are consistent and robust. However, we do not report these results in order to save space but
we can provide them on request. Additionally, it may be the case that a tracts demographic charac-
teristics (including income) change over time precisely because of rmslocation decisions: residents
express their preferences for environmental attributes by moving across jurisdictions. We deal with
this endogeneity issue in di¤erent ways.
First, we look at the correlations between ranking of tracts in 2000 and 2006. These results are
reported in Table A.6. Our results indicate that ranking of tracts based on income, education, and
population are highly correlated between 2000 and 2006 and the correlation coe¢ cient is more than 96
percent for all variables. To the extent that industrial concentrations in 2000 probably represent the
cumulative e¤ects of perhaps several decades, we might assume that sorting e¤ects at the beginning
or our sample period represent a population location equilibrium, or ex post sorting equilibrium.
Another way to deal with this reverse causality issue is to look at rmsentry models. Insofar as
entrants locational calculus is concerned, demographic characteristics of the potential localities are
largely given. With this in mind, we utilize an entry model for TRI-type rms by focusing only on new
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entrants in our sample period (2000-2006). Controlling for other relevant factors, we should observe
entrantspreferences with respect to local incomes without the issue of costly relocation that a¤ects
incumbent rms. Due to the large number of new entrants (11,752), it is not possible to estimate
this entry model using a conditional logit. Instead, we use the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood
(PPML) method with time xed e¤ects.17 Compared to the standard Poisson estimation, the PPML
the estimation does not assume that the data are distributed with the mean equal to the variance of
the event count. The data need not even come from a Poisson process and may be either under or
over-dispersed. However, note that the estimated coe¢ cients are nevertheless identical to the Poisson
regression estimates. All that is required for PPML consistency is that the conditional mean function
be correctly specied.18 Here, the dependent variable is the number of TRI-type entrants (y) for a
given tract (l) for a given year (t). Tract-level independent variables are as described before. The basic
model is as follows:
E[yltjXlt] = exp(X 0lt +  t) (4)
These entry results are presented in the Table 6. We observe a clear correlation between TRI-type
entrants and income (and other tract characteristics) as in our localization models. Although in this
case, entrants have a clear preference for lower income tracts. This exercise is consistent with our
theoretical prediction that local income drives rmslocation decision behavior.
3.6.3 MSA vs. Non-MSA
Next we check whether our results are driven by non-MSA tracts and by TRI polluters. We reestimate
our siting models where the dependent variable is the TRI type rms without reported polluters. That
is, we dene a category of TRI-type rms that contains only rms that have not reported a release.
Further, we estimate these models for both MSA and non-MSA tracts separately. We present these
results in Table A4 in the Appendix. Our ndings indicate that results are not driven by pollution-
reporting rms. Note also Column 4 that indicates that results for location choices of remediation
17 In the same way, we could try to deal with the potential endogeneity between local income and toxicity index by
estimating the e¤ect of income on the number of TRI-polluter entrants. De Silva et al. (2016) use a PPML specication
for TRI-polluters only and they nd an EKC-type relationship with income. Currie et al. (2015) also use entry of
TRI-polluters to evaluate the impact of toxic chemicals on infant health.
18For a more detailed discussion of this reasoning, see Gourieroux, Monfort, and Trognon (1984) and Santos Silva and
Tenreyro (2006, 2011).
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rms are una¤ected by the subtraction of TRI-polluters. The demand for waste management services
seem to be driven by rms that do not report releases.
3.6.4 Multiple establishments
Additionally, one might be concerned that rms with multiple establishments may locate their man-
ufacturing plant in a low income neighborhood while their sales o¢ ce may be located in an a­ uent
area. This does not seem to be the case in our sample as the average rm has only 1.3 branches.19
3.6.5 Non-TRI-type rms
It is natural to wonder if this inverted U-shaped relationship is not also observed in the case of non-
TRI-type rms. That is, is this result specic to TRI-type rms or does industrial localization more
generally exhibit this same pattern? To answer this question, we conducted a similar regression to
analyze the localization of non-TRI-type rms. As can be seen in Table A.5, there is a positive
relationship between income and localization of rms,ceteris paribus, over the two lower income splines
and then the relationship attens out (Column 1).
4 Entry and exit patterns in the remediation industry
In the previous section, we have shown that a local EKC-type relationship is consistent with an
increasing number of TRI-type rms coupled with increasing expenditures of those rms in waste
management activities. As mentioned above, this is our proxy for local demand for environmental
quality. Waste remediation rms supply pollution risk management services in response to the demand
for those services posed by potentially polluting rms. Given the importance of these activities to
obtain the EKC-type relationship, we investigate further the structure of the industry supplying these
remediation/waste management services.
4.1 Entry
In this section, we estimate the entry process of waste remediation establishments by census tract in
Texas on an annual basis over the years 2000-2006. Establishment entry in any year is dened as
19This number is computed excluding industries as such as retail gasoline, commercial printing, and food processing
which represent less than 5 percent of the sample. If we include these industries this number is about 2.6.
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the appearance (initial UI liability) of a new Enterprise Identication Number (EIN). We estimate
the number of entrants in a particular location (tract) as a function of location characteristics. These
characteristics include the number of remediation rms already present in that county (localization
e¤ects), the number of establishments in both TRI and non-TRI-related industries in that tract,
median personal income, level of education attainment, amenities, infrastructure, population density,
unemployment rate, and controls for housing ownership. We also include a dummy variable to control
for tracts that are in counties bordering nearby states and Mexico. We present the distributions of
incumbent and entrant rms for the waste remediation industry in Table 7.
The most common year of rm entry was 2002. This coincides with a TRI rule making which
lowered reporting thresholds for lead and lead compounds.20 De Silva et al., (2016) show that, in 2002,
the number of TRI reports involving lead or lead compounds increased six-fold compared to 2001. Also
note that the aggregate announced toxic weight increased by a factor greater than four in 2002 relative
to 2001. We argue that, with this threshold change, demand for waste remediation increased in 2002
and, hence, we see an uptick in entrants in 2002. There is an average of about 0.013 remediation
entrants per tract over the entire period of the sample.
We empirically model a rms (i) location (l - tract) choice of entry at time t in order to maximize
expected prots using a conditional Logit model (see McFadden, 1974). Each rms after-entry prot







lt +  t + ilt (5)
Alwt is the number of incumbent waste remediation rms that are in a tract l (which is a proxy for
the total investment in prevention e). Alpt is the number of incumbent rms that are TRI-type in
tract l, and Xl is the tract l specic characteristics, as mentioned above, in a given year, t. These
two variables, Alwt and Alpt, together capture the agglomeration e¤ects in tract l. We assume that
the disturbance, ilt, is independent and identically distributed.
In order to have a closed form expression for a rms choice probabilities, we also assume that the
ilt are distributed with a Type 1 extreme value distribution. We further assume that each rm knows
20See Title 40, Part 372 of the Code of Federal Regulations which is summarized in volume 66, number 11 of the
Federal Register.
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its private costs and expected prots. This asymmetric information assumption enables us to convert
the discrete actions of competitors into continuous location choice probabilities. Then, we can specify
the conditional logit model as follows:
Pr(Eilt = 1jAlwt; Alpt; Xlt;  t) = Pr(ilt > iktfor alll 6= k) (6)
The dependent variable Eilt equals 1 if a rm i chooses location l and 0 otherwise. A rm i will
choose location l when il > ik for all k 6= l. Therefore, conditional on the decision to open a new
plant, the probability that rm i will choose a particular location l can be written as follows:
















Results for the likelihood of entry are reported in Table 8. In all model specications, the local-
ization of remediation activity is important, all else equal. The estimated coe¢ cient of the variable
that uses the number of existing remediation rms as a measure of industrial concentration is positive
and signicant at the .01 level. In other words, the presence of incumbent remediation rms has a
positive impact on the likelihood of additional entry of remediation rms. This is consistent with the
presence of localization economies, or economies of scale from industrial concentration, that enhance
the attractiveness of a given location for a start-up or relocating establishment. Not surprisingly, the
presence of TRI-type rms matters with consistently and highly signicant coe¢ cient estimates across
all models.
This indicates that industries with a history of polluting rms are an important factor in the
presence of remediation rms. The estimated coe¢ cient on median income is also signicant and
positive and there is some evidence that the second derivative on the median income variable may be
negative or the relationship is concave. We also conclude that population matters, as does land area.
The signs of the coe¢ cients for both variables, ceteris paribus, imply that greater population density,
as would be expected, results in a higher likelihood of entry of remediation establishments. Of further
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interest is the estimated coe¢ cient on the ratio of college-educated residents. These results suggest
that higher levels of education correlate to lower remediation rm entry probabilities.
As a robustness check, we estimate the entry process using a count data model with time xed
e¤ects, specically a Poisson model estimated by Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML). Our depen-
dent variable is the number of waste management entrants (y) for a given tract (l) for a given year (t).
The basic model is as follows:




lt +  lt) (8)
Estimation results for these PPML regressions are contained in Table 9. No qualitative di¤erences are
observed between these two models. As before, there is evidence of localization e¤ects and demand-
side factors associated with a larger TRI-type rm sector on the likelihood of remediation rm entry.
In summary, the above ndings support our earlier conjecture that remediation rms will locate closer
to TRI-type rms.
4.2 Entry at random locations
As an additional robustness check, we look at entry by establishments in the remediation industries
into random locations that are not dependent on legal jurisdictional boundaries. The locations are
dened as non-overlapping rings of one-mile radius centered on establishments that are not in the
dened set of remediation industries that is, establishments in either a TRI-type or a non-TRI-type
industry, excluding the remediation sector.
This brings an additional level of spatial acuity into the analysis. We center the rings on existing
establishments because we want to limit the analysis to areas where there is commercial activity in
order to ensure that the chosen areas are actually potential choices for locating a new establishment.
Not doing so might result in choosing locations in which there is virtually no population, such as
remote rural or agricultural land with no industrial or commercial infrastructure, or no commercial or
industrial activity due to, say, zoning restrictions. Any non-remediation industry establishment that
existed at any point during the time frame of the study is a potential center point, thus allowing for
the possibility of new areas of commercial activity that came into existence during the course of the
analysis and the possibility that a remediation rm is the rst to enter the area.
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By maximizing the number of potential rings while imposing the non-overlapping condition, we get
8,142 rings. Table 10 provides summary statistics for these non-overlapping rings. We see 231 out of
395 entrants enter into these random locations. Figure 3 shows these locations.
The specic industry containing the rm that is used to center the random location ring does
not matter it only serves to locate a ring in an area that allows commercial activity. It is, rather,
the industrial content captured in the ring that matters. In this analysis, the variables of interest are
remediation industry establishments and TRI-type rms contained in the random rings. We are unable
to measure non-establishment variables, such as household income or other population characteristics,
at the spatial division of the rings. Hence, the other variables in the model are still measured at
the census tract level and reect the census tract in which the ring center is located. In general, this
represents measures for the census tract variable values that reect the tract in which the majority of
the area of the ring is located.
The results of the PPML estimation in Table 11 are quite similar to those based on establishments
at the census tract. That is, localization is, as before, an important determinant of the likelihood
of remediation establishment entry. Further, the presence of TRI-type establishments in the rings is
an important factor in location decisions of remediation industry establishments. Of interest, higher
wages in the surrounding census tract are signicantly associated with higher entry probabilities which
can reect the industrys demand for higher skilled labor.
4.3 Exit
Thinking about establishment exits, we have in mind a theoretical model involving a threshold rule
that is analogous to the prot maximization problem considered in our entry analysis. In this case, if
rms do not make a su¢ cient level of prot, they choose to exit the industry. In order to consider the
question of remediation industry establishment exit, we estimate logit models in which the dependent
variable is coded one if the rm exits during a given period, or as zero if the rm continues operation
through the entire period.
Exit is identied as having taken place if the rm (EIN) disappears from the data set at the outset
of a given calendar year and is treated as having occurred during the last year in which the rm is
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present in the data (year previous to disappearance). The time to failure is relative to the year in
which the rm entered the market. That is, we only consider rms that enter during the time frame of
the analysis, i.e., entry in years 2000-2006, and consider the exit event relative to the number of years
since entry. The observed number of years to failure, therefore, ranges from a low of one (failure in
year of entry) to a high of seven (no failure observed) across the establishments in the sample. Table
12 illustrates exit patterns. To interpret Table 12, note that, in year 2002, there were 98 entrants. By
2006, or over the course of the following ve years, 69 of them exited the market.
Overall, there were 395 entrants of which 214 of them had exited by 2006. Table 13 provides
establishment-level summary statistics. About 36% of the establishments have past experience in
the market. On average, these establishments have an additional branch or are part of a multi-
establishment rm. Additionally, these establishments pay about $49,000 per year in wages and employ
about 19 workers. This indicates that this labor force is highly skilled and limited to a given area.
Hence, we conjecture that rms will compete for the same resources and this will a¤ect the survival
rate. In this case, we expect agglomeration to increase the likelihood of exit.
Estimation results are reported in Table 14. In the case of localization e¤ects, the presence of
other remediation rms increases the likelihood of failure for these new establishments. On the other
hand, the numbers of local area TRI-type rms appear to have no inuence on exit probabilities. Not
surprisingly, like rms in most industries, the age of the rm and rm size (employment) are negatively
correlated with probability of failure in any given period. As with the other estimations above, local
income appears to have no statistically signicant e¤ect on exit.
5 Conclusion
We have employed detailed data for small geographies to analyze the posited theoretical relationship
between the localization of potentially polluting rms, toxic releases, and local-area incomes. Our
model suggests that prot-maximizing, potentially polluting rms behave rationally toward the nan-
cial risk inherent in a toxic release. Our conjecture is that, as risk exposure increases with incomes
within spatial proximity to those rms, the rms will take measures to manage that risk. We utilized
the localization of the waste management industry as a means of observing evidence of demand for
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risk-reducing options. In this context, rms can vary their utilization of waste management services
as an additional means of managing pollution risk across the spectrum of locations in lower income,
lower risk exposure areas to location in higher income, higher risk exposure areas.
We nd our results to be persuasive. We nd evidence consistent with our hyotheses, both in terms
of potentially polluting rmslocalization, the localization of waste remediation rms, and in terms of
the relative frequency of these rmsreported releases. (Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3.) Since the analysis was
made within a single state, we have largely controlled for heterogeneity in regulatory structures that,
under the traditional pollution haven argument, would lead to a similar result in terms of realized
releases if polluting rms were to exploit opportunities to locate in lower income areas anxious to
attract employers by providing relatively lax regulatory environments. While both explanations will
lead to a similar outcome, ours is driven by non-policy related incentives, although it does depend
on enforcement of a common set of laws. That is to say, the traditional economic paradigm of prot-
maximizing behavior in the presence of risk can explain the phenomenon of the local EKC independent
of any di¤erences across regulatory regimes.
Our results bear implications for policies that aim to enhance environmental justice, but also speaks
to policies that can exploit the incentives inherent in the standard paradigm of prot-maximization.
One of the objectives of the TRI Program was to create a strong incentive for companies to take
measures to reduce their toxic release and be good neighbors in their communities. During our sample
period 20002006, overall toxic releases in the US decreased by about 34% with a further decline of
about 21% since 2006. However, our paper shows that this decline might not be uniformly distributed
because rms respond to local demographic characteristics (including local income). In trying to
implement the lowest-cost response to the publication of the TRI data, rms will tend to reduce
releases through waste management when local opposition is the highest.
Combined with our nding that economic activity and local income are positively correlated, this
implies that the population group most a¤ected by toxic releases will be a working-class population
located in an industrial area. Our analysis suggests that without further actions, the disparities in
exposure to toxic release faced by certain population groups will not be reduced by simply requiring
that rms report their releases. If the attainment of greater environmental justice across population
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groups is a policy goal, serious thought should then be given to the regulations on compensation
schemes, designed to o¤set the costs of potential environmental risk.
28
References
[1] Arora, S., and Cason, T. N. (1999). Do community characteristics inuence environmental out-
comes? Evidence from the Toxic Release Inventory, Southern Economic Journal, 65(4), 691-716.
[2] Brooks, N., and Sethi, R.(1997). The distribution of pollution: community characteristics and
exposure to air toxics, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 32, 233-250.
[3] Coase, R. H. (1960), The Problem of Social Cost, The Journal of Law & Economics, 3, 1-44.
[4] Combes, P. (2000). Economic structure and local growth: France 1984-1993, Journal of Urban
Economics, 47 , 329-355.
[5] Currie, J., Davis, L., Greenstone, M., and Walker, R. (2015). Environmental health risks and
housing values: evidence from 1,600 toxic plant openings and closings.American Economic Review,
105(2), 678-709.
[6] de Bruyn, S. M., and Heintz, R. J. (1999). The Environmental Kuznets Curve Hypothesis. Chap-
ters,in: Handbook of Environmental and Resource Economics, chapter 46. Edward Elgar Publish-
ing.
[7] De Marchi, S., and Hamilton, J. T. (2006). Assessing the accuracy of self-reported data: an
evaluation of the toxics release inventory. Journal of Risk and uncertainty, 32(1), 57-76.
[8] De Silva, D. G., Hubbard T., and Schiller, A. R. (2016). Entry and Exit Patterns of ToxicFirms,
The American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 98 (3), 881-909.
[9] Fischel, W.A. (2005). The Home voter Hypothesis: How Home Values Inuence Local Government
Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies. Harvard University Press.
[10] Florida, R. and Davison, D. (2001). Why do rms adopt (advanced) environmental management
practices (And do they make a di¤erence?). In Regulating from the Inside, ed. C. Coglianese and
J. Nash, RFF Press: Washington D.C.
29
[11] Gamper-Rabindran, S. (2006). Did the EPAs voluntary industrial toxics program reduce emis-
sions? A GIS analysis of distributional impacts and by-media analysis of substitution. Journal of
environmental economics and management, 52(1), 391-410.
[12] Glaeser, E. L., Kallal, H. L., Scheinkman, J. A., Schliefer, A. (1992). Growth in cities, Journal of
Political Economy, 100 , 1126-1152.
[13] Gourieroux, C., Monfort, A. and Trognon, A. (1984). Pseudo Maximum Likelihood Methods:
Applications to Poisson Models, Econometrica, 52, 701-720.
[14] Grossman, G. M., and Krueger, A. B. (1993). Environmental impacts of a North American free-
trade agreement, in The U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, P. Garber, (ed.), MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
[15] Grossman, G. M., and Krueger, A. B. (1995). Economic growth and the environment, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 110, 353-378.
[16] Hamilton, J. H. (1995). Testing for environmental racism: Prejudice, prots, political power?
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 14, 107-132.
[17] Harbaugh, W. T., Levinson, A., and Wilson, D. M. (2002). Reexamining the Empirical Evidence
for an Environmental Kuznets Curve, Review of Economics and Statistics, 84 (3), 541-551.
[18] Harrington, D.R. (2012). Two-stage Adoption of Di¤erent Types of Pollution Prevention Tech-
nologies, Resource and Energy Economics, 34(3), 349-373.
[19] Harrington, D.R. (2013). E¤ectiveness of State Pollution Prevention (P2) Programs and Policies,
Contemporary Economic Policy, 31(2), 255-278.
[20] Henderson, V., Kuncoro, A., and Turner, M. (1995). Industrial development in cities, Journal of
Political Economy, 103, 1067-1090.
[21] Keller, W., and A. Levinson. (2002). Pollution Abatement Costs and Foreign Direct Investment
Inows to U.S. States. Review of Economics and Statistics 84, 691-703.
30
[22] Khanna, M., Deltas, G., and Harrington, D.R. (2009). Adoption of Pollution Prevention Tech-
niques: The Role of Management Systems, Demand-Side Factors and Complementary Assets.
Environmental and Resource Economics, 44(1), 85-106.
[23] Koehler, D. A., and Spengler, J. D. (2007). The toxic release inventory: Fact or ction? A case
study of the primary aluminum industry. nmsipassthru {Journal of Environmental Management},
85(2), 296-307.
[24] Levinson, A. (1996). Environmental regulations and manufacturers location choices: Evidence
from the Census of Manufactures, Journal of Public Economics, 62 (12), 5-29.
[25] List, J.A., and C.Y. Co. (2000). The E¤ects of Environmental Regulations on Foreign Direct
Investment. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 40(1), 1-20.
[26] List, J.A., W.W. McHone, and D.L. Millimet. (2003). E¤ects of Air Quality Regulation on the
Destination Choice of Relocating Plants. Oxford Economic Papers 55, 657-678.
[27] McFadden, D. L., (1974). Conditional logit analysis of qualitative choice behavior, Frontiers in
Economics, P. Zarembka (ed.), Academic Press: New York, 105-142.
[28] Olson, M. (1965). The logic of collective action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard.
[29] Papke, L. E., and Wooldridge, J. M. (1996). Econometric Methods for fractional response variables
with an application to 401(K) plan participation rates, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 11, 619-
632.
[30] Rosenthal, S. S., and Strange, W. C. (2003). Geography, industrial organization, and agglomera-
tion, Review of Economics and Statistics, 85, 377-393.
[31] Sam, A. G. (2010). Impact of government-sponsored pollution prevention practices on environmen-
tal compliance and enforcement: evidence from a sample of US manufacturing facilities. Journal
of Regulatory Economics, 37(3), 266-286.
[32] Santos Silva, J.M., and Tenreyro, S. (2006). The Log of Gravity, Review of Economics and
Statistics, 88 (4), 64158.
31
[33]   , (2011). Further Simulation Evidence on the Performance of the Poisson Pseudo-Maximum
Likelihood Estimator, Economics Letters 112 (2), 2202.
[34] Shadbegian, R., and Wolverton, A. (2012). Location Decisions of U.S. Polluting Plants: The-
ory, Empirical Evidence, and Consequences, International Review of Environmental and Resource
Economics, 4(1), 1-49.
[35] Stern, D. I. (2004). The rise and fall of the environmental Kuznets curve, World Development,
32(8), 1419-1439.
[36] Wolverton, A. (2009). E¤ects of Socio-Economic and Input-Related Factors on Polluting Plants
Location Decisions. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 9, 1-32.
32
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Table 1: Summary statistics by tract
Variable Mean (Standard deviation)














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4: Relative frequency of toxic release rms reported
Variable (TRI polluters / TRItype rms)lt
(1) (2) (3)
















































Number of observations 30,114 30,114 30,114
Log likelihood -1,215.000 -1,214.000 -1,178.000
*** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes statistical
signicance at the 5 percent level and *denotes statistical signicance at the
10 percent level.
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Table 5: Relative frequency of toxic release rms reported by industry
Variable (Chemical polluters / (Fabricated metal polluters / (Miscellaneous manuf. polluters /
total chemical rms)lt total fabricated metal)lt total miscellaneous manuf.)lt
(1) (2) (3)
















































Number of observations 30,114 30,114 30,114
Log likelihood -3,334.000 -2,649.000 -992.700
*** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes statistical signicance at the 5 percent level



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Entry patterns










Table 8: Conditional logit results for rm entry at tract level
Variable Firm entry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Number of environmental remediation 1.048*** 1.008*** 1.027*** 0.980*** 0.960*** 0.990*** 1.019***
incumbents
lt
(0.059) (0.063) (0.063) (0.064) (0.066) (0.062) (0.064)
Number of TRI type incumbentsilt 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004** 0.008*** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Median income $0 $66,700
lt
0.160*** 0.265*** 0.391*** 0.376***
(0.042) (0.052) (0.061) (0.062)
Median income >$66,700 $100,000
lt
-0.084 0.001 0.088 0.077
(0.091) (0.095) (0.098) (0.098)
Median income >$100,000
lt
0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.015
(0.089) (0.088) (0.086) (0.087)
Average wage (in $10,000)
lt
0.013* 0.016** 0.015** 0.013* 0.014** 0.014**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
College ratio
lt
0.080 -3.326*** -5.050*** -5.307*** -0.444
(0.706) (1.082) (1.215) (1.221) (0.880)
Number of amenity establishments
lt
0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of roads
lt
0.004 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of rail roads
lt
0.019** 0.018** 0.017* 0.019** 0.020**







0.052*** 0.068*** 0.041*** 0.038** 0.044*** 0.067***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)


















Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of entrants 395 395 395 395 395 395 395
Number of tratcs 4,302 4,302 4,302 4,302 4,302 4,302 4,302
Log likelihood -3,180.000 -3,157.000 -3,165.000 -3,149.000 -3,137.000 -3,141.000 -3,155.000
2 249.100 293.100 280.600 312.500 336.400 327.400 298.900
*** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes statistical signicance at the 5 percent level and
*denotes statistical signicance at the 10 percent level. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 for entry and 0
otherwise.
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Table 9: Models of aggregate entry counts
Variable Number of entrants
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Number of environmental remediation 1.048*** 1.008*** 1.027*** 0.980*** 0.960*** 0.990*** 1.019***
incumbents
lt
(0.059) (0.063) (0.062) (0.065) (0.067) (0.063) (0.065)
Number of TRI type incumbentsilt 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004** 0.008*** 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Median income $0 $66,700
lt
0.160*** 0.265*** 0.391*** 0.376***
(0.045) (0.059) (0.062) (0.063)
Median income >$66,700 $100,000
lt
-0.084 0.001 0.088 0.077
(0.096) (0.106) (0.107) (0.107)
Median income >$100,000
lt
0.001 0.005 -0.001 0.015
(0.087) (0.085) (0.083) (0.083)
Average wage (in $10,000)
lt
0.013*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
College ratio
lt
0.080 -3.326** -5.050*** -5.307*** -0.454
(0.761) (1.378) (1.392) (1.408) (0.942)
Number of amenity establishments
lt
0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of roads
lt
0.004 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Number of rail roads
lt
0.019* 0.018* 0.017* 0.019* 0.020*







0.052*** 0.068*** 0.041*** 0.038** 0.044*** 0.067***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
















Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 30,114 30,114 30,114 30,114 30,114 30,114 30,114
Log likelihood -1,987.000 -1,964.000 -1,972.000 -1,956.000 -1,944.000 -1,948.000 -1,962.000
*** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes statistical signicance at the 5 percent level and *denotes
statistical signicance at the 10 percent level. The dependent variable is the number of environmental remediation rms in a tract.
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Table 10: Summary statistics for randomly chosen non-overlapping locations
Variable Non-overlapping locations
Number of non-overlapping locations 8,142
Number of environmental remediation entrants 231












Standard deviation are in parentheses.
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Table 11: Aggregate entry counts at a random location
Variable Number of entrants
(1) (2) (3)
Number of environmental remediation 1.142*** 1.083*** 1.138***
incumbents within 0-1 mile
lt
(0.117) (0.116) (0.117)



























































Year e¤ects Yes Yes Yes
Number of obs. 56,994 56,994 56,994
Log likelihood -1,364.000 -1,351.000 -1,378.000
*** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes statistical
signicance at the 5 percent level and *denotes statistical signicance at the 10
percent level. The dependent variable is the number of environmental remediation
rms in a random location (within 0-1 mile.)
45
Table 12: Exit patterns
Entry year Total Exit year Total
entrants 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
2000 43 0 2 2 5 6 3 2 20
2001 47 5 6 16 6 3 3 39
2002 98 4 29 18 11 7 69
2003 54 7 11 10 5 33
2004 58 13 10 9 33
2005 50 9 7 16
2006 45 5 5
Total 395 0 7 12 57 54 46 38 214
Table 13: Establishment level summary statistics for exit
Variable Mean (Standard deviation)
Establishments with past experience 0.364
(0.481)
Average number of branches 1.021
(2.334)
Age (in months) 42.702
(22.532)





Table 14: Logit results for exit
Variable Exit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of environmental remediation 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.078***
incumbentsilt (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Number of TRI type incumbentsilt -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Establishments with past experiencei -0.016 -0.017 -0.016 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Number of branchesit -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ageit -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Median income $0 $66,700
lt
-0.005 -0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
Median income >$66,700 $100,000
lt
-0.003 -0.003 0.003 0.005
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Median income >$100,000
lt
0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Average wage (in $10,000)
lt
-0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Sizeit -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
College ratiolt -0.016 0.019 -0.204 -0.190 -0.260
(0.128) (0.171) (0.211) (0.209) (0.200)
Number of amenity establishments
lt
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of roads
lt
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of rail roads
lt
-0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001







0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)








MSA -0.005 -0.008 -0.004 -0.017 -0.001 -0.019
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.039) (0.047) (0.039)










Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346 1,346
Log likelihood -420.972 -422.477 -420.822 -419.178 -419.228 -419.759
*** denotes statistical signicance at the 1 percent level, ** denotes statistical signicance at the 5 percent level and







Figure 1: Relationship between housing prices and median income48
Table A.1: Variable Descriptions
Variable Description
Number of environmental remediation Number of environmental remediation per tract per year.
rmslt NAICS codes: 562112, 562211, 562910, and 562920
TRI type establishmentslt Number of TRI type rms per tract per year.
Tract-level toxicity (in pounds) The EPA provides toxicity weights for each chemical reported in the TRI which
allows for aggreating heterogeneous releases. We then aggregate total release per
tract for a given year.
Ageit Establishments age in months
Number of employeesit Establishment or tract level number of employees per year.
Employement ratioit This is the establishments employment divided by the total employees in the
industry in TX at a given year.
Wageit Establishment level wage per year.
Plant with past experiencei This is a plant with past experience in the industry
Number of branches in TXit Number of branches in TX
Number of roads
lt
We use the U.S. Census Bureaus Census Feature Class Codes (CFCC) to identify
roads. These road maps are provided by ESRI Data & Maps (2000) at census tract
level. We use all major highways to small roads that provide access to businesses,
facilities, and rest areas along limited-access highways.
Number of rail roads
lt
As in roads we use the U.S. Census Bureaus Census Feature Class Codes (CFCC)
and ESRI Data & Maps (2000) to identify rail roads. We use all major and minor
rail tracks identied by ESRI Data & Maps.
Median income ($)lt Census tract level median income.
Poverty ratiolt Census tract level percentage of the population under the poverty rate.
College ratiolt Census tract level college graduates as percentage of the population.
Number of amenity establishmentslt To measure the relative local presence of amenities, we compute the tract level
number of establishments in NAICS 71, Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation,
and NAICS 721110 (hotels and motels), 722110 (full service restaurants), and
722410 (drinking places, alcoholic beverages) as reported in the QCEW data.
Housing rental ratiolt Tract level percentage of housing stock rented.
Unemployment ratelt Census tract level unemploymentrate.
Population
lt
Census tract level total population.
TxDOT expenditures
lt
(in $1,000,000) We construct tract level road construction expenditures by weighting county totals
by tact level population.
Average house value
lt
Census tract level average house value.
Percent nonwhite residents Census tract-level share of nonwhite population per year.
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Table A.2: Explaining Variation in Toxic Pounds, TRI Type Firms, and Remediation Firms
Variable Toxicity Number of rms in
in poundslt TRI typelt Remediationlt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Median income (in $10,000)
lt
0.792*** 1.302*** 0.517*** 0.450***
(0.127) (0.138) (0.088) (0.085)
Median income (in $10,000)2lt -0.076*** -0.093*** -0.034*** -0.030***
(0.016) (0.019) (0.011) (0.010)
Median income (in $10,000)3lt 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)






1.028*** 2.760*** 0.018 -0.178
(0.191) (0.532) (0.199) (0.198)
Average wage (in $10,000)
lt
0.033*** 0.077*** 0.024*** 0.021***
(0.006) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004)
College ratio
lt
-5.325*** -8.741*** -3.978*** -3.543***
(0.916) (0.988) (0.648) (0.633)
Number of amenity establishments
lt
-0.007* 0.111*** 0.011*** 0.007***
(0.003) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of roads
lt
0.015*** 0.171*** 0.024*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.025) (0.002) (0.003)
Number of rail roads
lt
0.072*** 0.400*** 0.058*** 0.043***
(0.009) (0.037) (0.006) (0.006)
Unemployment rate
lt
0.014*** -0.005 0.021*** 0.023***
(0.005) (0.017) (0.007) (0.007)
Population (in 1,000)
lt
-0.001 0.106*** 0.034*** 0.032***
(0.008) (0.019) (0.009) (0.008)
Land area (in 100 in square miles)
lt
-0.034*** -0.315*** -0.110*** -0.083***
(0.013) (0.052) (0.025) (0.021)
Housing rental ratio
lt
-0.070 1.591*** 1.208*** 1.120***
(0.178) (0.334) (0.200) (0.192)
Border county e¤ects
lt
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 30,114 30,114 30,114 30,114
Log likelihood -3,283.000 -109,657.000 -9,644.000 -9,516.000
Uncensored observations 833 29,968 2,104 2,104
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.3: Explaining Variation in Toxic Pounds, TRI Type Firms, and Remediation Firms alternate specication
Variable Toxicity Number of rms in
in poundslt TRI typelt Remediationlt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Median income $0 $66,700
lt
0.244*** 0.621*** 0.309*** 0.274***
(0.034) (0.048) (0.033) (0.033)
Median income >$66,700 $100,000
lt
-0.017 0.047 -0.041 -0.051
(0.069) (0.113) (0.058) (0.056)
Median income >$100,000
lt
-0.628* -0.088 0.025 0.036
(0.359) (0.062) (0.052) (0.048)






0.868*** 2.633*** 0.046 -0.141
(0.180) (0.538) (0.196) (0.195)
Average wage (in $10,000)
lt
0.033*** 0.077*** 0.024*** 0.021***
(0.006) (0.012) (0.004) (0.004)
College ratio
lt
-5.735*** -8.845*** -4.090*** -3.650***
(0.960) (1.021) (0.648) (0.632)
Number of amenity establishments
lt
-0.007* 0.111*** 0.011*** 0.007***
(0.003) (0.014) (0.001) (0.001)
Number of roads
lt
0.015*** 0.172*** 0.024*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.025) (0.002) (0.003)
Number of rail roads
lt
0.071*** 0.398*** 0.057*** 0.043***
(0.009) (0.037) (0.006) (0.006)
Unemployment rate
lt
0.012** -0.012 0.020*** 0.022***
(0.005) (0.017) (0.007) (0.007)
Population (in 1,000)
lt
-0.002 0.107*** 0.033*** 0.031***
(0.008) (0.019) (0.009) (0.009)
Land area (in 100 in square miles)
lt
-0.031** -0.312*** -0.107*** -0.081***
(0.012) (0.052) (0.024) (0.021)
Housing rental ratio
lt
-0.028 1.580*** 1.209*** 1.121***
(0.177) (0.339) (0.200) (0.193)
Border county e¤ects
lt
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 30,114 30,114 30,114 30,114
Log likelihood -3,298.000 -109,663.000 -9,636.000 -9,508.000
Uncensored observations 833 29,968 2,104 2,104
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.4: Explaining Variation in TRI Type Firms (with and without TRI), and Remediation Firms
Variable Number of rms in
TRI typelt Remediationlt
(without TRI) MSA Non-MSA
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Median income $0 $66,700
lt
0.548*** 0.359*** 0.323*** 0.279***
(0.045) (0.059) (0.066) (0.032)
Median income >$66,700 $100,000
lt
0.107 0.099 -0.962*** -0.054









Average wage (in $10,000)
lt
0.077*** 0.071*** 0.244*** 0.021***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.070) (0.004)
College ratio
lt
-10.191*** -8.663*** 1.950 -3.585***
(0.916) (1.097) (1.677) (0.626)
Number of amenity establishments
lt
0.110*** 0.105*** 0.110*** 0.007***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.001)
Number of roads
lt
0.168*** 0.210*** 0.041*** 0.015***
(0.025) (0.032) (0.004) (0.003)
Number of rail roads
lt
0.388*** 0.484*** 0.130*** 0.044***
(0.038) (0.050) (0.012) (0.006)
Unemployment rate
lt
0.004 -0.019 -0.028* 0.022***
(0.016) (0.020) (0.014) (0.007)
Population (in 1,000)
lt
0.116*** 0.092*** 0.308*** 0.031***
(0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.009)
Land area (in 100 in square miles)
lt
-0.328*** -0.518*** -0.041*** -0.080***
(0.055) (0.149) (0.011) (0.020)
Housing rental ratio
lt
2.671*** 1.598*** 1.818*** 1.067***
(0.357) (0.424) (0.506) (0.176)
Border county e¤ects
lt
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year e¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 30,114 24,654 5,460 30,114
Log likelihood -109,629 -91,844 -13,111 -9,511
Uncensored observations 29,968 24,534 5,434 2,104
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A.5: Explaining Variation of NonTRI Type Firms
Variable Number of rmslt
(1)




















































Number of observations 30,114
Log likelihood -113,216.000
Uncensored observations 0
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A.6: Tract ranking
Variable 2006
Income Education Population
Income 0.964
2000 Education 0.990
Population 0.960
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